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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






MARLON GERARDO PALMER 
a/k/a MARLON GERARDO PALMER-SAMPSON, 
 
                                 Petitioner, 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
                                  Respondent. 
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA 1:A017-556-268) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Walter A. Durling 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 9, 2011 
 
Before:   JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and WEIS, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  April 5, 2011) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Marlon Palmer petitions this Court to review a decision by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge 
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(“IJ”) denying his applications for a waiver of deportation under Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (“INA”) § 212(c).  Palmer also asserts that the BIA erred by 
dismissing his claim that his former counsel provided him ineffective assistance.  For the 
reasons discussed below, we will deny the petition for review.  
I.   Background 
Palmer is a native of Costa Rica and was admitted to the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident in December of 1967.  On April 1, 1996, Palmer made a threatening 
phone call to a Pennsylvania judge who had incarcerated Palmer for failing to pay certain 
fines.  Palmer was subsequently arrested, tried, and convicted for making terroristic 
threats, harassment, and retaliation for past official action.  On February 5, 1997, he was 
sentenced to a period of probation for the threats and harassment convictions and a period 
of incarceration for the retaliation conviction.  On December 17, 2002, Palmer was 
resentenced to a period of one to five years’ incarceration with a credit of sixty-nine days 
served for violating the conditions of his probation related to his terroristic threats 
conviction and to a period of sixty-nine days to one year for violating the conditions of 
his probation related to his harassment conviction.  Palmer was released from jail on 
October 10, 2008, and subsequently charged with removability pursuant to INA 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated 
felony.   
On March 11, 2009, an IJ found Palmer to be removable after holding that his 
terroristic threats conviction under Pennsylvania law constituted a conviction for an 
aggravated felony.  Applying the law in effect at the time of Palmer’s arrest, the IJ further 
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held that Palmer was ineligible for a waiver of deportability under INA § 212(c) since he 
was incarcerated for at least five years as a result of his terroristic threats conviction.   
Palmer appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.  He argued that he was prejudiced by 
ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was eligible for § 212(c) relief because it 
was error to count the time he spent in jail for violating probation as time he was 
incarcerated for his terroristic threats conviction.
1
  The Board dismissed his appeal.  It 
held that Palmer failed to meet his burden on his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and it agreed with the IJ that Palmer had served at least five years’ incarceration 
as a result of his terroristic threats conviction due to his resentencing for violating his 
probation.  
Palmer’s timely petition for review is now before us.   
II.   Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
We have jurisdiction to review the final decision of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).  We must sustain the BIA’s decision if it is supported by substantial 
evidence.  Jarbough v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 483 F.3d 184, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2007).  We 
look to the decision and reasoning of the IJ, to the extent the BIA deferred to or adopted 
it; otherwise, we look to the decision of the BIA.  See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 
508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006); Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).  The BIA’s 
decision “must be upheld unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but 
compels it.”  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).   
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 Palmer did not challenge his removability on appeal. 
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III.   Discussion 
The record does not compel us to overturn the BIA’s dismissal of Palmer’s appeal.  
Palmer’s conviction for making terroristic threats constitutes a conviction for an 
aggravated felony under the INA.  See INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) 
(defining an aggravated felony to include “a crime of violence … for which the term of 
imprisonment [is] at least one year”); Bovkun v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 166, 169-70 (3d Cir. 
2002) (holding that, under Pennsylvania law, a terroristic threats violation is a crime of 
violence for immigration purposes).  Therefore, Palmer is removable unless he qualifies 
for a waiver under former § 212(c).  INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Under the version of § 212(c) that was in force on the day of 
Palmer’s arrest,2 Palmer would not qualify for a waiver if he was convicted of an 
aggravated felony and served a term of imprisonment of five years or greater.  INA § 
212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (effective until April 24, 1996) (subsequently amended) 
(stating that waiver is unavailable “to an alien who has been convicted of one or more 
aggravated felonies and has served for such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of 
at least 5 years”).  Substantial evidence in the record before us supports the BIA’s 
conclusion that Palmer served at least five years in jail for violating the terms of his 
                                              
2
 We reference the date of Palmer’s arrest only to demonstrate that even under the 
more forgiving version of § 212(c) in effect on the date of Palmer’s first interaction with 
the justice system with regard to his terroristic threats conviction, Palmer would not 
qualify for a waiver of deportation.  We do not reach or comment on whether changes to 
§ 212(c) that occurred after Palmer’s arrest or conviction may apply to him.  See Atkinson 
v. Att’y Gen., 479 F.3d 222 (3d. Cir. 2007) (discussing retroactivity of amendments to 
§ 212(c)).  
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probation relating to his terroristic threats conviction.
3
  That five-year period of 
incarceration properly relates back to Palmer’s original terroristic threats conviction.  See 
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700-01 (2000) (holding that penalties associated 
with revocation of parole are attributable to the original conviction).  Therefore, Palmer 
would not have qualified for a waiver under former § 212(c).
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IV.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Palmer’s petition for review.  
                                              
3
 Palmer was incarcerated from the day he was resentenced for his probation 
violation, December 17, 2002, until October 10, 2008.  Before he was resentenced for his 
probation violation, Palmer had served sixty-nine days in jail – a time which was credited 
against his term of imprisonment for violating his probation for his terroristic threats 
conviction.  That time of pre-sentencing incarceration is properly counted towards the 
term Palmer served for his aggravated felony.  See Moreno-Cebrero v. Gonzales, 485 
F.3d 395, 398-400 (7th Cir. 2007) (time spent in pre-trial detention counts toward the 
five-year incarceration term under § 212(c)); Spina v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 470 F.3d 
116, 127-29 (2d Cir. 2006) (same).  Therefore, Palmer served a total of six years in jail 
for violating the terms of his probation, five years of which is attributable to his violation 
of the terms of his probation relating to his terroristic threats conviction. 
4
 Because our conclusion regarding Palmer’s failure to qualify for a waiver under 
former § 212(c) is dispositive, we do not reach the other issues raised by Palmer on 
appeal.  See Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 623 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(holding it prudent not to decide issues unnecessary to the disposition of a case). 
